50 years ago, Milton Friedman articulated the natural rate hypothesis. It was composed of two sub-hypotheses: First, the natural rate of unemployment is independent of monetary policy. Second, there is no long-run trade-off between the deviation of unemployment from the natural rate and inflation. Both propositions have been challenged. The paper reviews the arguments and the macro and micro evidence against each. It concludes that, in each case, the evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive. Policy makers should keep the natural rate hypothesis as their null hypothesis, but keep an open mind and put some weight on the alternatives.
Introduction
Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman (1968) delivered his Presidential address "The Role of Monetary Policy at the December meetings of the American Economic Association, and articulated what became known as the "natural rate hypothesis." It was a joint hypothesis, composed of two sub-hypotheses:
The first was that there was a natural rate of unemployment, independent of monetary policy. To quote Friedman (p. 8): "The 'natural rate of unemployment [...] is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on."
The second was that monetary policy could not sustain unemployment below the natural rate without leading to higher and higher inflation, a proposition that became known as the "accelerationist hypothesis". Again, to quote Friedman (p. 11): "There is always a temporary trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off. The temporary tradeoff comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation, which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation. The widespread belief that there is a permanent trade-off is a sophisticated version of the confusion between "high" and "rising" that we all recognize in simpler forms. A rising rate of inflation may reduce unemployment, a high rate will not."
For the sake of clarity, in the rest of the paper, I shall refer to the joint hypothesis as the "natural rate hypothesis," and the two separate sub-hypotheses as the "independence hypothesis" and the "accelerationist hypothesis." Note that they are separate hypotheses. The implications will be different if either one fails separately, or if both fail.
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Notice also that, while Friedman referred to unemployment, he clearly had in mind output more generally. The natural rate hypothesis can be recast in terms of output: that is, potential output is independent of monetary policy, and there cannot be sustained deviations of output above potential without increasing inflation. Thus, in this paper, I shall look at the evidence for both unemployment and for output.
Together, the two hypotheses have very strong implications. If inflation is to remain stable, periods during which output exceeds potential output must be offset by periods during which output is below potential; in other words, booms must be fully offset by slumps. Monetary policy cannot do more, and indeed should not try to do more, than smooth fluctuations around the independent path of potential output.
While the natural rate hypothesis was controversial at the time, it quickly became widely accepted, and has been the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics ever since. It is embodied in the thinking and the models used by central banks, and it is the basis of the inflation targeting framework used by most central banks today.
There were always grumblings about the extent to which this hypothesis fully characterized the world, about whether potential output was really independent of monetary policy, and about whether there really was no longrun trade-off between inflation and output. In the 1980s in particular, the natural rate of unemployment in Europe appeared to increase following every recession, and the idea that high actual unemployment might cause an increase in the natural rate became more popular. Hysteresis, which refers to the theory that changes in the natural rate of unemployment can be pathdependent (an idea which could be traced at least to Phelps (1972) ), Larry Summers and I argued, could be the explanation for this increase (Blanchard and Summers (1986) ). But after a while, as the so-called Great Moder- This is for two reasons, both linked to the Great Financial Crisis and the accompanying recession. First, the level of output appears to have permanently been affected by the crisis and its associated recession. This is shown in Figure 1 , which plots the evolution of log GDP since 2000 for both the United States and in the European Union, both normalized to equal 100 in 2000. In both cases, it appears as if the output path has shifted down and is now increasing along a lower trend line than before the crisis (The two trends are based on the average quarterly growth rates over 2000 to 2007).
This pattern led Summers (2014) Now consider the channels which have been emphasized in "hysteresis models". Some of these channels may indeed imply a permanent effect of monetary policy. For example, if a recession leads to lower research and development for some time, and if total factor productivity depends in part on the accumulation of past research and development efforts, then total factor productivity may indeed be permanently be lower than it would have 1 The magnitudes are small, for two reasons: The monetary shock is small, and the effects of monetary policy on actual output in the model are small as well. These aspects are however not relevant to the point made in the text. I am thankful to Mathias Trabandt for performing these simulations. The original paper does not show the path of potential output or the path of the natural rate. been absent the recession. But some of the channels which have been studied suggest persistent effects, rather than permanent ones. For example, if some of the long-term unemployed become unemployable, the effect will eventually disappear as these workers reach the age at which they would have stopped working anyway.
In short, all relevant models imply an effect of monetary policy on potential output and on the natural rate lasting for some time. 2 The goal of the empirical work must be, at the macro level, to assess the degree of persistence of the effects, and, at the micro level, to identify and examine specific channels of persistence. The results are shown in Figure 4 for the various pre-recession and postrecession time intervals. The average output gaps are typically negative, but the results are less consistent than for unemployment, and are more sensitive to the time intervals used to estimate the pre-recession gap. Also, the averages hide substantial heterogeneity. While the average gaps are negative, the proportion of negative output gaps over all time intervals is only 55 percent, which offers only weak support for the hysteresis hypothesis.
An obvious question is how to reconcile the unemployment and the output results. To make progress, I decompose the log output gap between a log employment gap and a log productivity gap, using for each the same methodology as for log output, so the sum of the two gaps is equal to the output gap. The results (reported in the appendix) lead to three main conclusions: The employment gaps are consistently negative, largely insensitive to the choice of time interval, and close to the unemployment gaps reported above. The productivity gaps are, perhaps surprisingly, often positive, and are sensitive to the choice of pre-recession time interval. A tentative explanation for this sensitivity is, again, that most disinflation episodes took place around the same time, and one unusual pre-recession year can affect the results quite strongly.
Can the evidence from the other 100 recessions, those not caused by explicit disinflation efforts, be used to learn about persistent effects of monetary policy shocks? The answer is yes, but only if one is willing to make further assumptions. If, for example, one assumes that long run labor supply is inelastic -be it individual labor supply or the relation between the wage and unemployment derived from matching-bargaining models -then if one finds persistent effects of non-monetary shocks on unemployment, this suggests the presence of channels relevant for monetary shocks also.
For an example, consider the case of recessions brought on by oil price increases. To the extent that such shocks are persistent, they imply a decrease in real consumption wages relative to trend; but if long run labor supply is inelastic, this should eventually have no effect on unemployment.
What about output? Theory suggests that, while oil shocks should not have a direct effect on productivity (as productivity is the ratio of value addedwhich, if correctly measured, is unaffected-to employment), they may have an indirect effect on productivity growth. For example, to the extent that technological progress is directed by shifts in economic incentives, a change in oil prices may well lead to a temporary slowdown in productivity growth The argument correctly emphasized the power of insiders in wage formation, but it was too strong. Even if the employed workers do not care about the unemployed, they should care about their own situation, were they to become unemployed. The higher the unemployment rate, the more willing they should be to accept a lower wage. Also, wages are not set unilaterally by workers (or by unions), but rather unilaterally by firms or by a process of bargaining between firms and workers. In this case, wages will reflect the option of firms to hire the unemployed. The higher the unemployment rate, the larger the pool of potential hires, the stronger the firms will be in bargaining. For both reasons, even with selfish insiders, unemployment will matter.
One of the major research developments of the 1980s and 1990s was the development of a framework capturing these aspects, based on matching and bargaining, with the basic framework now known as the DMP model, for the work by Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides. It gives a better way to think about the effect of unemployment on wages, and how the strength of the effect depends on the structure of the labor market and on labor market . While these measures were taken to limit the initial increase in unemployment and make it less painful, it is likely that they increased the natural rate. However, this explanation is specific to those recessions, and does not provide for a general channel of high persistence.
3 Indeed, the model by Christiano et al. used to generate Figure 2 above incorporates a formalization of the labor market reflecting matching and bargaining. Unemployment is a state variable, leading to a persistent, but not permanent, effect of monetary policy shocks on the natural rate. 4 In Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), we took a first pass at it, by looking at the interaction of shocks and institutions in determining effects of shocks on unemployment. But much remains to be done.
Yet another channel, and at this point probably the most popular one among researchers, has focused on the effect of high unemployment on the morale, skills, and employability of the long-term unemployed.
It has long been known that the probability of becoming employed decreases with the duration of unemployment. For example, based on data from the Current Population Survey for 1994-2016, the average probability of becoming employed in the following month decreases from 28 percent if unemployed for less than 27 weeks to 14 percent if unemployed for more than 27 weeks. At the end of 2009, when the U.S. unemployment rate reached a high of 10 percent, the probability of reemployment in the following month was 18 percent if unemployed for less than 27 weeks, but only 10 percent if unemployed for more than 27 weeks.
While these comparisons are suggestive, they do not prove however that the long-term unemployed become less employable. It may be instead that the workers who are the most employable are hired first, and thus the longer the duration, the less employable is the remaining pool. However, two recent papers suggest that hysteresis -in this case, the effect of unemployment duration on employability -might be at work. First, Krueger et al (2014) use the time structure of the Current Population Survey(in the sample for four months, out for eight months, back in for four months) to look at the more relevant longer transition probabilities, and confirm the message from monthly probabilities. On average, for the period 1994 to 2012, the average probability of being employed 15 months later was 55 percent for those unemployed for less than 27 weeks, but only 40 percent for those unemployed for more than 27 weeks. Second, Abraham et al. (2016) link data from the Current Population Survey and the unemployment benefit register, and look at the employment history of the long-term unemployed. They find that the probability of being employed eight quarters earlier is roughly similar for the short-term and the long-term unemployed. If we think of this probability as 20 OLIVIER BLANCHARD a proxy for workers' characteristics, this suggests that the long-term unemployed have roughly the same characteristics as the short-term unemployed, and that their lower probability of becoming employed is primarily caused by the duration of their unemployment rather than by their unobservable characteristics.
One more step is needed to prove the case for hysteresis. It could be that the decreased probability reflects mostly the fact that firms, when they have the choice, often give priority in hiring to those who have been unemployed the least time (a decision rule that Diamond and I (1994) have called "ranking".) If this is the case, so long as unemployment is high and firms get many applicants, the long-term unemployed will be less likely to get a job. But as unemployment decreases and the number of job applicants declines, the long term unemployed will be more often at the front of the line, and see If so, the data can be seen as providing some evidence for hysteresis.
To the extent that decreased employability is a source of hysteresis, one can then explore non-linearities and asymmetry between recessions and booms. As shown in Figure 5 , leaving aside short-run dynamics (which lead to countercyclical loops), the ratio of long-term unemployment to total unemployment is strongly increasing in unemployment. Put another way, the long term unemployment rate is convex in the unemployment rate. If we think of the number of workers who become unemployable as roughly proportional to the number of long-term unemployed, this implies that hystere- sis is asymmetric, being more relevant in recessions than in booms.
If some workers become less employable or become discouraged, then the unemployment statistics will fail to capture hysteresis effects fully, because many of these workers will drop out of the labor force. Indeed, a recent question has been whether, in the United States, the high unemployment due to the financial crisis has contributed to the drop in labor market The macroeconomic evidence given earlier, suggested that, at least for disinflation-related recessions, the main channel of persistence was through employment rather than productivity. Nevertheless, it is useful to briefly explore this potential channel as well.
I discussed earlier the role of lower capital accumulation in leading, during the recession, to a decrease in labor productivity given total factor productivity. Rough computations suggest however that the decline in the capital stock during a typical recession, and by implication the effect on labor productivity given total factor productivity, are small. Theory suggests however that recessions could have a permanent effect on total factor produc-
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OLIVIER BLANCHARD tivity itself and, by implication, on labor productivity. If we think, somewhat simplistically, of total factor productivity as being determined in part by the sum of past spending on research and development, then lower research and development during a recession will lead to permanent lower total factor productivity (and a boom will do the reverse). However, the empirical evidence suggests again limited effects: A regression of the rate of change of research and development spending on the rate of change of GDP for the To summarize: Of the microeconomic channels potentially behind high persistence, the most persuasive one appears to be that high unemployment leads some workers to be less employable or to give up on looking for jobs, increasing unemployment or reducing the labor force, and by implication, leading to a persistent effect on potential output.
The accelerationist hypothesis
The story of the changing Phillips curve -the relation between inflation and unemployment -has been told many times. Soon after Friedman's (1968) presidential address, and just as he had predicted, the trade-off between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate which had characterized the 1960s started to weaken, replaced in time by the "accelerationist Phillips curve", a relation between the unemployment rate and the change in the inflation rate. Put another way, the coefficient on lagged inflation in the Phillips curve steadily increased from a value close to 0 to a value close to 1.
This shift was documented in real time during the 1970s. For example, Perry (1970) estimated the coefficient on lagged inflation to be 0.34, while Perry (1978) estimated the same coefficient as 1.0. Starting in the 2000s however, the coefficient has sharply declined, and appears now to be again close to zero. This is shown in Figure 7 , which gives the evolution of the coefficient on lagged inflation in a simple specification regressing CPI inflation on a constant term, itself lagged and the unemployment rate, using annual data should find that inflation expectations respond little to core, but respond to deviations of headline from core, coming for example from sharp, and thus more salient, changes in gas prices. Given this motivation, Table 1 The regression results suggest two conclusions. First, professional forecasters put more weight on core than on the deviation of headline from core.
In the more recent sample, the weight on core has increased, the weight on the deviation has decreased, suggesting indeed higher credibility of monetary policy.
Second, consumers put instead more weight on the deviation of headline minus core than on core. And in the more recent sample, they appear not to put any weight on core (I have no ready explanation for the negative, but insignificant, coefficient on core), and some weight, although less than before, on the deviation of headline from core. This is suggestive of decreased salience: Consumers now ignore inflation, unless some large change, such 5 The questions asked of consumers are: During the next 12 months, do you think prices in general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are? If people answer "up" or "down", they are then asked: By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, during the next 12 months? If they give an answer greater than 5%, they are probed to make sure they understood the question. The details of aggregation are given in Curtin (1996) ]. What is reported is the median of the distribution. as a change in gas or food prices, takes place.
To summarize: The econometric relation between unemployment and inflation today is at odds with the accelerationist hypothesis, suggesting that inflation expectations have become largely non-responsive to actual inflation. While increased credibility of policy is clearly a factor, the evidence from consumers' expectations suggests that decreased salience may be at work. To the extent that these expectations, together with those of firms, are the relevant determinants of wage and price decisions, then, so long as inflation remains low enough, there may be an exploitable persistent, if not permanent, trade-off between unemployment and inflation.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
The policy implications of deviations from the natural rate hypothesis depend very much on the specific channels, the non-linearities, the asymmetries that each of these channels implies. Persistence based on loss of morale or skills by workers may have different welfare implications from hysteresis based on insider-outsider considerations. 6 Persistence based on the effects of long-term unemployment is more likely to be asymmetric than hysteresis based on the effects of activity on R&D and technological progress. It is also more likely to be non-linear with respect to the depth and the length of recessions. At this point, the empirical evidence is just too crude to give us precise guidance.
Yet the basic implications of deviations from either the independence hypothesis or the accelerationist hypothesis, or both, can be shown simply.
Start with the independence hypothesis. Assume that (the log of) poten-tial output, y * follows:
Potential output next period depends on potential output today and on the deviation of actual output from potential output today. For notational simplicity, the specification ignores all other shocks which affect potential output, and normalizes long run potential output, if the deviation of output from potential is equal to zero, to be equal to zero. Relax instead the accelerationist hypothesis, so x is now positive. Assume past inflation to be equal to zero. So long as the output gap is such that inflation does not exceed c∆, the increase in the output gap leads to higher current inflation, but no increase in inflation in future periods. Thus, failure of the accelerationist hypothesis leads to a more attractive trade-off between output and inflation.
Relax both hypotheses, and an increase in the output gap today leads to both a larger increase in future output, and a smaller increase in future inflation, with both effects leading to an even more attractive trade-off between output and inflation.
This toy model can and should be extended in many dimensions, in particular to allow for a richer specification of the response of inflation expecta- is a strong case, although not an overwhelming case, to allow U.S. output to exceed potential for some time, so as to reintegrate some of the workers who left the labor force during the last ten years.
